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No campaign plan survives ﬁ   rst contact with the 
enemy.—Helmuth Graf von Moltke 
In Australia, the outbreak of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
began in Melbourne, Victoria; in the ﬁ   rst 17 days, the 
Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory 
detected 977 cases. Although the laboratory had a 
pandemic plan in place, a retrospective evaluation found 
3 major variations from plan assumptions: 1) higher peak 
demand not limited by a case deﬁ   nition, 2) prolonged 
peak demand because containment attempts continued 
despite widespread inﬂ  uenza, and 3) unexpected inﬂ  uence 
of negative test results on public health actions. Although 
implementation of the plan was generally successful, the 
greatest challenges were limited availability of skilled staff 
and test reagents. Despite peak demand of 1,401 tests 
per day, results were provided within the usual 24 hours 
of specimen receipt; however, turnaround time seemed 
slower because of slow transport times (>3 days for 45% 
of specimens). Hence, effective laboratory capability might 
be enhanced by speeding  transport of specimens and 
improving transmission of clinical data.
T
he pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreak in Australia was 
detected in Victoria on May 18, 2009, and during 
the following weeks spread to other states. Pandemic 
planning guidelines for Australia consist of 4 phases (1): 
delay (identify and test persons who meet a clinical case 
deﬁ  nition), contain (home quarantine laboratory-conﬁ  rmed 
case-patients and give antiviral prophylaxis to their 
contacts), sustain (restrict laboratory testing to persons 
with clinically deﬁ  ned cases who are at increased risk for 
severe outcomes), and protect (identify and manage those 
at risk for severe illness and those in vulnerable settings 
such as aged-care facilities). The pandemic plan envisaged 
all Australian states moving together through the pandemic 
phases. In practice, however, Victoria implemented the 
sustain phase, referred to as modiﬁ  ed-sustain, sooner than 
other states.
The ﬁ  rst 3 case-patients were siblings who had recently 
returned from the United States (Figure 1). When the 
outbreak began, Victorian health authorities implemented 
the contain phase (3), and laboratory conﬁ  rmation  of 
cases was conducted by the Victorian Infectious Diseases 
Reference Laboratory (VIDRL). Attempted containment 
ceased on June 3 when conﬁ   rmed cases totaled 977, 
at which time laboratory testing was restricted to that 
appropriate under a modiﬁ  ed-sustain phase. By June 23, 
when the modiﬁ  ed-sustain phase ended, 1,406 cases had 
been laboratory conﬁ  rmed and 1 patient had died. Testing 
efforts subsequently moved to those required under the 
protect phase. By September 27, a total of 6,895 cases in 
Victoria had been reported, 24 of them fatal (3), although 
the true number of cases is probably greater.
We describe VIDRL provision of laboratory support for 
the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreak response in Victoria. 
We critically appraise the effectiveness of this laboratory’s 
pandemic planning from 3 perspectives: 1) how the reality 
of the pandemic matched planning assumptions, 2) how 
successfully this planning facilitated workﬂ  ow in practice, 
and 3) how successfully the laboratory delivered the 
required testing.
Pandemic Planning
Our planned algorithm for inﬂ  uenza A virus testing 
involved extraction of RNA from clinical specimens 
by using QIAxtractor or BioRobot Universal System 
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extraction robots (each from QIAGEN, Valencia, CA, 
USA), followed by reverse transcription with random 
hexamers. cDNA was ampliﬁ  ed in parallel assays by using 
an Applied Biosystems 7500 Fast Real-Time PCR System 
(Foster City, CA, USA) and incorporating primers and 
probes selective for the matrix gene of inﬂ  uenza A viruses, 
including that of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, and for 
the hemagglutinin (HA) gene of that virus. (Sequences of 
all primers and probes used in these assays are available 
upon request to M.C.).
Our model of anticipated pandemic inﬂ  uenza testing 
comprised 2 phases. First, an initial peak of intense testing 
needed to identify early cases would result in >500 additional 
PCRs being conducted each day for 2 weeks. Second, a 
step-down in demand with a focus on severe or atypical 
cases that needed testing for clinical management would 
result in ≈200 tests being conducted each day for several 
months. Implicit in the latter phase was that a clinical case 
deﬁ  nition would sufﬁ  ce for most uncomplicated inﬂ  uenza 
cases and that dominant circulation of the pandemic strain 
would enable a test result of “inﬂ  uenza A detected” from 
many laboratories to be a de facto diagnosis of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 infection. Some laboratory capacity would be 
reserved for outbreak monitoring by sentinel surveillance 
and detailed strain characterization. All routine diagnostic 
laboratory activity (≈1,000 tests/day) for diseases other than 
inﬂ  uenza would proceed routinely, but elective activities 
such as research would be delayed as needed.
To realize this pandemic plan, certain measures 
were undertaken at VIDRL. They were 1) assembly of 
enough nucleic acid extraction robotics and real-time PCR 
analyzers for >500 daily PCRs, 2) recruitment and training 
of 2 additional scientists who could work in the testing 
laboratory during a major outbreak, 3) planning for the 
temporary reassignment of scientiﬁ  c staff with appropriate 
skills from other laboratory areas during an outbreak, 4) 
cross-training of secretarial and clerical staff to enter 
patient and specimen data into the laboratory information 
system, 5) manning of the laboratory telephone switchboard 
by clerical staff, and 6) creation of a small stockpile of 
essential laboratory reagents.
Effectiveness of Testing 
During the initial contain phase, the number of tests 
run was high. On June 1, the day of peak testing, 1,401 
PCRs for inﬂ  uenza were performed, this being the sum of 
the matrix gene PCRs performed on each referred specimen 
and HA gene PCRs performed on matrix gene PCR-positive 
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Figure 1. Number of patients with inﬂ  uenza-like illness and numbers 
of laboratory detections of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 derived from 
primary care physician inﬂ   uenza surveillance together with the 
phases of the outbreak in Victoria (VIC). The phases are as follows: 
delay (conduct active surveillance and border control measures), 
contain (restrict establishment of the pandemic), modiﬁ  ed-sustain 
(minimize transmission and maintain health services), and protect 
(focus on those at risk for severe outcomes). Modiﬁ  ed from (1,2), 
Figure 2. Number of diagnostic 
specimens received at the Victorian 
Infectious Diseases Reference 
Laboratory and laboratory detections 
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, 
Victoria, Australia, 2009.Laboratory Service during Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
samples (Figure 2). In contrast, a typical daily peak number 
in winter would be ≈100. However, the laboratory was able 
to sustain peak levels of inﬂ  uenza testing and provision 
of results within typical turnaround times. The times 
from specimen data entry into the laboratory information 
system to result reporting were calculated by extracting 
data from the Laboratory Information System (Medipath, 
LRS Health; Melbourne, Victoria, Australia) with an 
integral analytic software module. Because the actual time 
of specimen arrival is not searchable on our system, the 
representativeness of this electronic data as a proxy for 
total test turnaround time was veriﬁ  ed by a manual audit of 
200 Medipath ﬁ  les. This procedure compared the manually 
stamped arrival time and date on scanned digital images 
of specimen request forms received on June 1, the busiest 
day of the outbreak, with the corresponding time and date 
recorded electronically for result reporting. This manual 
audit gave a faster estimate for turnaround time than the 
electronic search, probably because the latter includes data 
from weekends (data not shown).
The mean turnaround time from specimen data 
acquisition to result reporting for the 4 peak months of the 
2009 outbreak was <24 hours (Figure 3). For all except a 
2-week period in June, this turnaround time was faster than 
the equivalent turnaround time for the winter of 2008. The 
main contributors to this outcome were longer than usual 
working hours for scientiﬁ  c and support staff, coupled with 
high levels of automation.
Specimens were transported by courier to VIDRL 
from Melbourne hospitals, other laboratories, and general 
practitioners on behalf of Victorian health authorities. The 
duration of time from specimen collection to arrival at 
VIDRL varied. Transport times for all pandemic (H1N1) 
2009–positive samples were calculated by comparing the 
interval between the laboratory receipt time and date stamp 
and the recorded collection time and date on digital images 
of specimen request cards. Positive samples were chosen 
for analysis because of the relative ease with which this 
dataset could be collated from the laboratory information 
system. The positive samples were representative of the 
total sample group from which they came; ≈15% of positive 
specimens arrived on the day of collection, 40% arrived the 
next day, and ≈30% arrived over the next 2 days (Figure 4). 
Despite maintenance of typical test turnaround times, these 
transport times contributed to clinicians’ perception of slow 
turnaround times (4), for which VIDRL received numerous 
complaints. During the pandemic, it was common to 
receive telephone inquiries for results for specimens that 
had arrived only hours earlier or had yet to arrive.
Our pandemic planning had focused primarily on 
resources and processes under our control within the 
laboratory. However, for optimal functioning of the whole 
testing cycle, the movement of specimens and accompanying 
data from patient to testing site and provision of results 
back to the patients’ caregivers must also be optimal. To do 
so required a systemwide planning approach that was less 
than complete at the onset of the pandemic. More planning 
will be needed for optimal functioning under the pressures 
imposed by a future large outbreak (Table).
Effectiveness of Pandemic Planning
During the pandemic, 3 key elements differed 
substantially from our planning assumptions: 1) we did 
not predict the expectation that all community respiratory 
disease would be tested, 2) we did not plan for testing 
to continue long after widespread community spread of 
inﬂ  uenza was evident, and 3) we had not considered that 
negative test results would be so inﬂ  uential to the public 
health response. This outbreak was the ﬁ  rst  inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic during which provision of real-time diagnostic 
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Figure 3. Mean turnaround times for Victorian Infectious Diseases 
Reference Laboratory detection of inﬂ  uenza,  Victoria,  Australia, 
2008 and 2009.
Figure 4. Timing of receipt of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus–
positive specimens by the Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference 
Laboratory, Australia, 2009.SYNOPSIS
virologic testing on large numbers of specimens had been 
a practical possibility. This testing capability created high 
expectations among users of our service. Our pandemic 
planning had sought to provide a realistic volume of testing 
capacity for anticipated public health and clinical needs. 
However, the initial expectation from the community and 
many clinicians during the contain phases was that all 
cases of respiratory disease in the community would be 
tested. This expectation is not unusual in highly publicized 
infectious disease outbreaks, but because the at-risk 
population was effectively unlimited in this outbreak, the 
demand was extreme. Most samples received were from 
persons who were relatively healthy, as evidenced by 
telephone conversations between our medical staff and 
patients, clinical details when provided on request forms, 
and by the dramatic drop in demand later during the sustain 
phase when testing was focused on those truly at risk for 
serious illness (Figure 2).
Our planning model of a 2-week initial surge followed 
by a step-down to clinically focused testing proved correct. 
However, the contain phase of high-demand testing 
continued well beyond the point at which it was ﬁ  rst evident 
that community transmission was widespread. Only 9 of 
the ﬁ  rst 978 case-patients had a history of overseas travel 
(3), and pandemic (H1N1) 2009 began to be detected from 
our sentinel general practitioner inﬂ  uenza  surveillance 
network within the ﬁ  rst week of the outbreak (3). Unlimited 
testing as inﬂ  uenza spread rapidly in the community drove 
testing demand to extremely high levels. The reasons for 
continuation of the contain phase are complex but were 
in part a consequence of the pandemic plan’s treatment of 
the country as a homogeneous whole, although in reality 
the Victoria outbreak occurred several weeks sooner than 
outbreaks in other Australian states (5). In contrast to 
the higher than expected peak, testing levels during the 
subsequent step-down phase were lower than provided for 
in our plan (Figure 2). This ﬁ  nding is consistent with the 
relative clinical mildness of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
virus strain; in Victoria, only 0.3% of infected patients 
were hospitalized in the ﬁ  rst 10 weeks of the outbreak (6).
In past outbreaks, we focused on urgent and accurate 
communication of positive laboratory results that identiﬁ  ed 
cases, and we communicated negative results en masse 
by routine systems, including electronic links to major 
health care institutions. However, during pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009, major public health actions were triggered 
by negative results, including cessation of quarantine 
restrictions and decisions about antiviral prophylaxis. 
While communication of large numbers of positive results 
to clinicians and public health authorities challenged 
resources, urgent and personalized transmission of a much 
larger number of negative results was not possible. This 
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Table.  Summary of laboratory effectiveness during pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Victoria, Australia, 2009 
Challenge Potential solution 
Data management 
  Pressure on specimen data entry into laboratory information  
 system 
  Direct electronic communications of specimen data from  
  referring source to laboratory 
  Missing telephone, fax, address details on request forms    Direct electronic communication of results from laboratory to  
 referring  source 
  Volume of negative results precluding telephone contact with  
 referring  source 
  Direct electronic communication of results from laboratory to  
 referring  source 
Specimen transport 
  Slow    Multi-institution planning of efficient emergency specimen  
 transport 
  Poor interfacing with test start times in laboratory    Multi-institution planning of efficient emergency specimen  
 transport   
Staff
  Finite laboratory staff resources    Further minimization of manual steps for specimen processing 
  and additional staff cross-training 
Telephone  inquiries 
  Difficulty manning switchboard over extended laboratory hours    Planning for additional agency staff during emergencies 
  High call volume to laboratory taking scientific staff away from 
 testing 
  Minimization of inquiries through improved specimen transport 
  and data management  
Reagents 
  Shortages threatening test capacity    Expansion of reagent stockpile and use of validated test  
  protocols using reduced reagent volumes  
Communication
  Misunderstandings regarding scope and objectives of  
 laboratory  testing 
  Strengthened lines of communication between laboratories,  
  clinicians, and health authorities 
Pandemic planning 
  Lack of flexibility to accommodate verging levels of influenza 
  activity at state jurisdiction level 
  Adapted pandemic plan Laboratory Service during Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
limitation was further compounded by the frequency with 
which telephone or fax numbers of primary care physicians 
were missing on request forms; hence, laboratory reporting 
depended on postal addresses, which were also frequently 
incomplete or missing. Spot checks of request forms 
performed several times during the outbreak found this 
problem on up to 10% of request forms.
Implementation of Planning
Many aspects of our laboratory pandemic planning 
worked well in practice; outbreak testing facilities and 
equipment platforms provided the required test capacity 
(as many as 1,400 extra PCRs in 1 day). Employment of 
additional scientists before the outbreak also provided 
considerable beneﬁ   ts. In other areas, a great deal of 
commitment and hard work from staff compensated for 
planning shortcomings. Notably, preparations for surge 
capacity in several support areas, including patient data 
entry and dealing with telephone inquiries, could not 
match demand and required additional effort to resolve 
bottlenecks. Because our system of data entry requires 
speciﬁ  c skills, we could not use temporary agency staff for 
data entry. In practice, cross-trained secretarial staff and 
volunteers proved too slow for the demand, and their needs 
for support impeded the work of skilled staff. Particularly 
after hours, laboratory test results were often available 
before complete data entry had been performed, delaying 
release of hard-copy laboratory reports. A technical 
solution involving electronic upload of test requests from 
clinicians seems the best future approach to this problem.
Scientists in our organization who were not involved 
in inﬂ   uenza testing, envisaged as providing a pool of 
supplementary staff with PCR or virology skills, were 
rarely able to perform this function during the outbreak. The 
capacity of support staff who were performing functions 
such as specimen reception was almost entirely consumed 
by the demands of receiving inﬂ  uenza specimens. Staff 
in other laboratory areas helped absorb demand by taking 
over these functions for their own specimens but then 
could not reasonably release scientiﬁ  c staff to supplement 
inﬂ  uenza testing. As a result, those involved in inﬂ  uenza 
testing worked long hours, supported by scientists from 
other laboratory areas who were also working overtime. 
Although this approach was sustainable for weeks, it could 
not have continued through the outbreak.
Lastly, the small stockpile of PCR reagents proved 
insufﬁ  cient. The high demand for testing during the contain 
phase required a commensurate amount of reagents. 
Suppliers in Australia were initially unable to keep up 
with our rapidly escalated demand. This limitation was 
successfully managed by using reduced reaction volumes 
(because of a shortage of random hexamers, the volume of 
reverse-transcribed cDNA was halved); changing aspects 
of our testing algorithm (from an initial test algorithm 
involving inﬂ  uenza A matrix gene PCR primers and H1 
HA gene primers run in parallel to an algorithm involving 
the matrix gene alone with subsequent HA subtyping of 
positive samples on the same day); and, immediately 
after introduction of the modiﬁ  ed-sustain phase, adhering 
rigidly to the criteria for test eligibility circulated by health 
authorities. Adhering to these criteria included storing, but 
not testing, samples from persons determined to not be at 
substantial clinical risk. This practice caused unhappiness 
among some clinical colleagues but preserved sufﬁ  cient 
capacity to guarantee testing for patients in clinical need.
Outbreak Monitoring
As described elsewhere (2,3), a network of 80 general 
practitioners in metropolitan Melbourne and rural Victoria 
conducted inﬂ  uenza surveillance, coordinated by VIDRL, 
from May through October 2009. Laboratory testing for 
inﬂ  uenza was conducted for a subset of these cases, and 
test results were made available online (7). This testing 
activity was maintained during the time of heavy laboratory 
demand because of the perceived need to collect unbiased 
data on inﬂ   uenza activity comparable to data collected 
during the previous 10 years of inﬂ  uenza surveillance.
The number of laboratory-conﬁ  rmed cases of pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza (3) was heavily inﬂ  uenced by community testing 
behavior and by guidelines for testing promulgated by 
health authorities. This inﬂ  uence is shown clearly in the 
abrupt reductions in testing and detections of inﬂ  uenza in 
Victoria after June 3, when the pandemic response phase 
changed from contain to modiﬁ   ed-sustain (Figure 2). 
Hence, the number and timing of laboratory-conﬁ  rmed 
cases were unrepresentative of the wider outbreak. In 
contrast, laboratory-supported inﬂ  uenza  surveillance 
undertaken in parallel with diagnostic testing provided 
monitoring of the course of the outbreak relatively free 
of these effects (Figure 1) and, as described elsewhere, 
enabled direct comparison of the outbreak with >10 years 
of seasonal inﬂ  uenza (3,7,8).
Conclusions
Operationally, the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreak 
tested our laboratory preparedness in ways that no exercise 
could; yet some of the potential pressures were limited 
by the relatively low clinical severity of the virus. The 
numbers, speed, and accuracy of tests conducted, along 
with real-time tracking of the outbreak through laboratory-
supported inﬂ  uenza surveillance, were unimaginable less 
than a decade ago. Facilities, equipment, and PCR-based 
testing performed extremely well. Limits to the available 
pool of skilled staff and the threat of reagent shortages 
provided challenges where contingency plans had only 
been partly successful. Staff performed admirably in the 
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face of these challenges, but in the future, more effective 
solutions will be required. The greatest improvements in 
overall performance of the laboratory testing cycle will 
be achieved through increasing the speed of specimen 
transport and improving transmission of clinical data to and 
from the laboratory.
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